A deadline that passed quietly
October 18 was supposed to be the day India found out whether its exports to the United States would face a tariff of up to 100%. Instead, on October 16, President Trump signed an executive order waiving the core tariff and sanctions provisions of the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026. He cited the "national interest" of the United States and sent Congress the written certification the law requires.
For Indian exporters, that was a relief. It was also the fourth major change in US tariff policy toward India in roughly a year, and how it happened matters more than the outcome.
The timeline
2025. Indian goods faced a combined US tariff of 50%: a 25% reciprocal tariff, plus an additional 25% imposed as a penalty for India's purchases of Russian oil.
February 2026. On February 2, Washington announced a framework deal cutting the tariff on Indian goods to 18%. In return, India agreed to stop buying Russian oil and lower trade barriers. The Russia-oil penalty was removed. Later that month, a US Supreme Court ruling on tariff powers added fresh uncertainty, but the framework rate stayed in place.
September 2026. On September 18, President Trump signed the Graham Act, after it passed the Senate 86-11 in August and the House 262-159 on September 16. The law lets the President impose tariffs of up to 100% on all goods from the largest buyers of Russian oil and gas. Legal analysts named India, China and Turkey as the most likely targets. India had its own part in this. Russian crude reached a record 50.83% of India's oil imports in July, more than 2.47 million barrels a day, well after the February commitment.
October 2026. Within weeks of signing the Act, the US agreed to import Russian diesel itself. On October 16, Trump waived the tariffs. Reporting tied the timing to US efforts to bring down diesel prices before the November 3 midterm elections.
What changed, and what didn't
India's position on Russian oil didn't change between September and October. What changed was the US domestic situation. In September, Russian energy purchases were grounds for a 100% tariff threat against India. In October, with fuel prices rising before an election, the US was buying Russian diesel and the threat was set aside.
That doesn't make the September threat unjustified on its own terms. India had bought more Russian crude than its February commitment implied, and Washington had a legitimate interest in enforcing the deal. But the reversal shows what drives US trade decisions now. They follow American politics (election dates, fuel prices, calls between leaders) as much as they follow the behaviour of the country on the receiving end.
The waiver also left a lot in place:
- The power remains. The Graham Act lets the President impose these tariffs for five years unless Congress ends that power. A waiver suspends the measures; it doesn't repeal them.
- The 18% rate still applies. The February framework has not been turned into a signed agreement.
- The deal is still open. On October 15, Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal said the first part of the India-US trade agreement was finalised and in legal drafting. US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer said earlier in the month that a deal was not "imminent", and Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman described the talks on October 5 as having reached a "plateau".
Why unpredictability is a cost in its own right
For a business, a tariff isn't just a number on today's invoice. It's a forecast that sits inside every decision about where to build, what to ship and which markets to serve.
Consider an investor deciding whether to put a factory in India to supply the US market. An 18% tariff that holds for ten years is a cost they can model, price and plan around. An 18% tariff that can turn into 100% within weeks, at any point over the next five years, is a different kind of risk. The expected cost is higher, and the range of possible outcomes is wide enough to change the decision itself. Faced with that, many investors will either demand a higher return, delay, or choose a location whose access to the US doesn't depend on the outcome of the Russia question.
That's why the waiver doesn't fully undo the damage of the threat. The threat showed how quickly market access can change, and the waiver showed it can change back just as fast, for reasons the exporting country doesn't control.
Where India's options stand
There are signs that Indian exporters are already adjusting. Goods exports rose 23% in September to $44.4 billion, with July-September the best second quarter on record. Coverage noted higher shipments to the US, likely including some front-loading ahead of the deadline. Exporters have also been betting on markets opened by India's newer trade agreements.
That second point matters most. As Goyal argued in Chicago on October 3, India's trade agreements now cover economies worth about $70 trillion, with $15 trillion more under negotiation. Those agreements don't replace the US market, which remains India's largest single destination. What they do is lower the cost of any one partner changing the rules. When access to one market depends on another country's election calendar, access to many others is the best protection available.
What India should do next
Finish the interim deal, but don't treat it as a guarantee. A signed agreement is better than a framework, and the first part is reportedly in legal drafting. But any concession that rests on a waiver or on the President's goodwill can be withdrawn. Indian policy and Indian businesses should plan on that basis.
Keep the Russia question honest. India's oil purchases are part of why the threat existed. Whatever New Delhi decides about Russian crude, it should be a deliberate choice with its trade costs in view, rather than a commitment that gets quietly overtaken by events.
Keep building other markets. Ratifying and bringing into force the EU and UK agreements, and helping exporters actually use the preferential rates in existing deals, is the practical way to reduce exposure to a single partner.
The waiver bought time. It didn't buy certainty, and Indian trade policy should be built on the assumption that certainty won't come from Washington.