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Finance & Investment

SEBI and RBI Just Split the Job of Making InvITs Investable

SEBI and RBI moved on InvITs four weeks apart in 2026, and the two circulars do opposite things to the same asset class on purpose.

Two Regulators, One Underbanked Asset Class

Infrastructure Investment Trusts have a bankability problem that has nothing to do with the assets underneath them and everything to do with how those assets get valued and how their cash gets counted. NaBFID and BCG put a number on the scale of it in their September 17 report at the Infrastructure Conclave in Mumbai: India needs ₹168-172 trillion in infrastructure capital through FY31, and 55-57% of that, including metro rail, water, and non-commercial rail, has no standalone bankable revenue model. Roads sit closer to the bankable end because tolls are a real cash flow. But even a toll road InvIT has had two structural problems: maintenance spending that disappears from distributable income the moment it is debt-funded, and no consistent rule for what happens when a trust simply doesn't disclose its Net Asset Value properly. SEBI fixed the first problem. RBI fixed the second. Neither fix works without the other.

What SEBI Changed: Cash Flow That Used to Vanish

In August, SEBI's circular on Net Distributable Cash Flow computation for road InvITs let trusts add back major periodic maintenance expenses to distributable cash flow when that maintenance is funded through external borrowing. The change is scoped narrowly, limited to the Roads and Bridges sector, and it isn't automatic. A trust needs a 60% unitholder vote to use it, and its statutory auditor has to certify exactly how the borrowed money was used. That second condition matters more than it looks. SEBI isn't just relaxing a cash flow definition, it is making the relaxation conditional on paper trail. Before this circular, an InvIT that took on debt to resurface a highway saw that spending reduce the cash available for distribution in the year it happened, even though the debt itself, not the year's operations, was funding the work. Investors read that as a bad year. Now, with the debt properly documented and unitholders on record approving the treatment, that maintenance cash flow gets added back. Distributable income goes up without the underlying toll economics changing at all. For a pension fund or insurer that prices infrastructure debt off distributable cash flow, this single change makes previously middling road InvITs look meaningfully better funded.

What RBI Changed: A Floor for the Assets That Don't Comply

On September 22, RBI issued Amendment Directions on how banks and All India Financial Institutions must value unquoted REIT and InvIT units they hold. The rule is direct: value at the disclosed Net Asset Value, computed and published the way SEBI requires. If a trust fails to calculate or disclose that NAV to SEBI's standard, the unit gets marked down to a flat ₹1, regardless of what the trust itself claims it's worth. This is not a valuation methodology so much as a penalty schedule dressed as one. RBI is telling every bank holding these instruments that the NAV on their books is only as good as the trust's compliance record, and where that compliance is missing, the asset is worth almost nothing on paper until it's fixed. For a well-run, fully compliant trust, this changes nothing; its NAV was already accurate. For a trust that has been sloppy about disclosure, or one that never built the reporting infrastructure to begin with, this is an immediate balance sheet event for every bank holding its units.

Why Split the Job This Way

Put the two circulars side by side and the design becomes obvious. SEBI's change rewards trusts that document their debt-funded maintenance properly, with governance built in through the unitholder vote and auditor sign-off. RBI's change punishes trusts that can't produce a clean, SEBI-compliant NAV at all. One raises the ceiling for the compliant. The other drops the floor for the non-compliant. A sovereign wealth fund or pension fund evaluating an infrastructure allocation in India isn't underwriting the traffic risk on a specific highway, not primarily. It's underwriting whether the number on the statement is real and whether the manager will keep it real after the money is in. SEBI's NDCF change gives well-run trusts more legitimate cash flow to distribute. RBI's NAV floor makes it expensive, in balance sheet terms, for badly-run trusts to hide behind a stale or fabricated valuation. Together they don't expand the InvIT universe, they sort it, and they do it in a way that costs the regulators nothing beyond the paperwork. This is consistent with the pattern already visible in MoRTH's revised Model Concession Agreement from August 10, which added an Article 29 clause backing toll road revenue shortfalls above 10% and explicitly opened concession bidding to sovereign and pension funds. Read against that, the SEBI and RBI moves aren't isolated financial-sector housekeeping. They are the valuation and cash-flow-accounting half of the same push to make Indian infrastructure paper legible to capital that has never had to underwrite Indian disclosure risk before.

The Open Question

None of this manufactures new bankable projects. It cleans up the accounting and valuation of projects that were already close to investable, and it draws a harder line around the ones that weren't. That is worth doing on its own, since the NaBFID-BCG number suggests capital is not the binding constraint on Indian infrastructure investment right now, credible, well-governed cash flow is. Whether that is enough to actually pull incremental sovereign or pension allocation into Indian InvITs, rather than simply repricing risk among the institutions already invested, is the harder question, and it will only be answered by watching where new capital actually lands over the next two or three fund cycles. What would move that needle further: a mandatory, standardized disclosure format across all InvITs, or is the market-based sorting SEBI and RBI just built enough on its own?